At ITW'10, Bringer et al. suggested to strengthen their previous identification protocol where the security depends on computational assumptions (related to the Polynomial Reconstruction problem) by extending the Code Reverse Engineering (CRE) problem to identification codes. We formalize this new problem and we extend security results by Tillich et al. on this very problem. This enables us to prove the security of this protocol using information theoretical arguments. Index Terms-Code Reverse Engineering (CRE), identification codes, Reed-Solomon.
I. INTRODUCTION
A T Indocrypt'09, Bringer et al. [3] introduced a new identification protocol based on the use of identification codes [1] . Their proposal, denoted here the BCCK identification protocol, relies on a construction of identification codes by Moulin and Koetter [14] using Reed-Solomon codes. In a few words, the BCCK identification protocol can be described as follows (cf. Fig. 1) .
A low-cost contactless device (CLD) and its reader want to mutually authenticate themselves. The CLD stores two secret polynomials , known only by the Reader; to authenticate itself to the CLD, the reader proves the knowledge of by sending where is the -th element of a finite field . The CLD proves its identity by replying with . [3] proves the security and the privacy properties of their protocol relying on a classical cryptographic assumption known as the Polynomial Reconstruction problem [8] - [11] .
We here want to switch from this computational perspective to an information theoretical one.
On one hand, a first attempt was made in this direction by [12] where some recommendations are made on the code parameters, based on list decoding difficulty with respect to the Polynomial Reconstruction problem, to reach this more stringent goal. On the other hand, [2] introduces an extension of the BCCK identification protocol, simply considering that the underlying Reed-Solomon codes stay unknown from the adversary who has thus to solve the Code Reverse Engineering (CRE) problem [4] - [6] , [15] to recover the initial parameters of the Manuscript BCCK identification protocol. This restriction on what is available to the adversary does not modify the underlying structure of the BCCK identification protocol.
In this paper, we formalize this CRE problem for identification codes and we obtain general estimations of the difficulty of this new problem either for independent received messages or for not independent ones. We show that, in fact, an adversary cannot solve this problem easily. Our results are based on those of [6] . We consider different cases taking into account the noise over the channel and the capacity of the adversary to isolate or not the communications of a CLD. Finally we apply these results to the BCCK identification protocol.
II. RELATED WORKS

A. Identification Codes
Identification codes have been introduced by Ahlswede and Dueck in [1] to answer a different problem from transmission codes. Transmission codes can correct errors which happen during a noisy emission of a message whereas identification codes enable to test whether a particular message was sent. To quote [7] , transmission codes answer the question "What message has been sent?" and identification codes "Has message been sent?". Informally, an identification code is given by a set of probabilistic coding functions, along with decoding sets. This has a negative impact as we have to take into account the probabilities of false-negative and false-positive identifications. In return, this gives us two interesting properties.
• The identification of one element among others is possible by conveying only . This means that the string we have to transmit can be very short. • The probabilistic coding scheme increases a lot the job of the eavesdropper who would like to track a particular identity as the same identifying bit string is not used twice except with a small probability. Let , be two alphabets, the message length, and a channel from to , defined as a conditional probability law:
is the probability to receive a message given a transmitted message . By extension, for a given 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE subset , is the probability to receive a message belonging to when has been transmitted.
Definition 1 (Identification Code, [1]):
A -identification code from to is given by a family with where: For all , such that : • is a probability distribution over , that encodes (the encoding set of is defined as the set of messages for which , in other words, the set of messages likely to encode ); • is the decoding set; • and are the first-kind and second-kind error rates, with and (where is the probability to be in the decoding set given a transmitted message and the probability to be outside the decoding set). The set corresponds to the list of messages that can be communicated. In practice, to encode , one draws at random a message such that and transmits this message over the communication channel. When receiving a message , one tests if it corresponds to a given by checking whether is in .
The error rate gives the probability of a false-negative, and , of a false-positive identification: • The first-kind error rate implies that for a given , we have a probability to receive a message that is not in the decoding set of . • The second-kind error rate means that for another encoded index we have a probability that the received message is in (while we have a probability that it is also in ). To simplify the discussion in Sections III and IV, we restrict ourselves to the case where error rates inequalities above are in fact equalities (i.e., the error rates are the same for all choices of and ).
B. Moulin-Koetter Identification Codes
There have been different proposals for constructing identification codes [13] , [14] , [17] . Moulin and Koetter introduce in [14] the following identification code based on Reed-Solomon codes.
A Reed-Solomon code over a finite field , of length , and dimension , is the set of the evaluations of all polynomials of degree less than , over a subset of size . Let . In other words, for each -tuple , the corresponding Reed-Solomon word is the -tuple where . In the sequel, we identify a source word with the corresponding polynomial .
Definition 2 (Moulin-Koetter RS-Identification Codes):
Let be a finite field of size , and an evaluation domain . Let be the set of all polynomials over of degree at most , with a description as with . Consider the collection of the sets for all polynomials in . Then the Moulin-Koetter Reed-Solomon Identification Codes are defined by:
• for all , their encoding distribution which is taken as the uniform distribution over ; • for all , their decoding set that is defined as . In particular, encoding and decoding sets are both the . The encoding of an index is to choose randomly an element in , i.e., take a random and output
. The decoding of a received message with respect to the identification of the index is to determine whether there is an element in that is close to . From the definition and the fact that the Reed-Solomon codes are Maximum Distance Separable, this leads to identification codes for a noiseless channel from to where: • as all messages (encoded and received) are elements from sets ; • is the number of polynomials over of degree at most ; • is estimated thanks to the minimum distance of the underlying code. The Reed Solomon codes are Maximum Distance Separable so the minimum distance is . A set is made of the coordinates of the Reed Solomon codeword associated to . Consequently the intersection of two sets and contains at most elements. Thus if we consider that the channel is noiseless; • as the received message is equal to the encoded message if the channel is noiseless. Note that in the sequel, we will focus on a noiseless channel.
C. The BCCK Identification Protocol
The setting is a reader with a set of devices to which it can send identification queries. Each device is associated with two different random polynomial identifiers-say , for the device -in of degree at most . and are both stored on the CLD side and in the verifier database.
To communicate with the device , the reader chooses randomly and broadcasts the message . When receiving this message, a device-with associated polynomials , -will check whether the received message is in its decoding set (i.e., corresponds to its polynomial ). If this is not the case, the device remains silent. If this is the case, the device replies with . Then the reader authenticates the device if the received value is equal to . In [3] , the security and privacy properties of the protocol are analyzed following the security and privacy model from [16] . Adversary is an active one that can communicate, control some devices, try to impersonate a reader and devices, eavesdrop, corrupt… The security results are based on a computational assumption-derived from the Polynomial Reconstruction problem [11] -and include the following points: correctness of the protocol; resistance against impersonation of devices, against replay attacks, against impersonation of the verifier; privacy. These security results are established mainly depending on the number of queried devices during the same period and the number of eavesdropped interrogation requests.
Practical Parameters: Throughout this paper, we take in the different examples the parameters suggested in [3] for the identification protocol of Fig. 1: , , . This situation fits well with real-life low-cost devices with a non-volatile memory of about . These parameters enable [3] to prove the computational security with up to 2048 interrogations of the same device without compromising the device identity.
D. Code Reverse Engineering Problem
The CRE problem [4] - [6] , [15] corresponds to the situation where an observer tries to retrieve information from an eavesdropped communication without any specific prior knowledge on the encoding representation of the transmitted data.
In the CRE problem, it is assumed that the adversary knows the length of the encoded messages and a subset of codes of length . Then by eavesdropping several messages over a noisy channel, he tries to determine from which code they are generated. [6] ): Let be a family of codes of given length and given rate .
Definition 3 (Code Reverse Engineering Problem
• Let be a code chosen randomly in and be random codewords to be transmitted over the communication channel. • Given the received words , the problem is to guess which has been used. The difficulty depends on the number of received words, the level of noise and the rate of the codes. In [6] , the authors analyze the number of eavesdropped messages that is needed to achieve a correct guess with good probability.
Let and be two random variables. Let , respectively and , denote the binary entropy of , respectively the conditional entropy of given , and the mutual information of and . When assuming that the codewords are chosen independently and that the channel is memoryless, we have the following result. This implies that the closer the mutual information and are, the harder to guess is. Thanks to Fano's inequality, [6] estimates also how large should be to achieve a good guess of with negligible error probability when and go to infinity; this needs . Still in [6] , the result is then exploited for linear codes with rate below the channel capacity (i.e., being able to decode correctly with overwhelming probability a received word when large) and for regular LDPC codes.
III. CRE FOR IDENTIFICATION CODES
In this section, we show how to extend the Code Reverse Engineering problem and the bounds from Section II-D to the case of identification codes. This is the first important contribution of this paper.
We extend Definition 3 in the context of transmission codes to identification codes and this gives the following definition.
Definition 4 (Identification CRE Problem):
Let , be two alphabets, , be two integers, and be two values between 0 and 1, and be a family of identification codes (cf. Definition 1) from to , all with parameters . • Let be a code chosen randomly in and be random messages-chosen independently of -to be encoded over the channel. • Given the received messages , the problem is to guess which has been used.
Remark 1: Note that we modify the original problem, replacing the encoded messages by the messages to be encoded, to be able to address the identification codes and the situation without errors in the BCCK identification protocol.
Note also that by definition of identification codes the indices are in , so it is easy to realize a random choice independent of the code .
For a memoryless channel, Lemma 1 is adapted accordingly as follows.
Lemma 2:
For independent choices of , the conditional entropy of the identification code given the received messages satisfies i.e.,
where and are two random variables distributed respectively as the 's and the 's. Proof: We adapt the original proof of Lemma 1. We have . As the words are independent and the channel is memoryless, the are independent. From , we thus obtain Note that we have the following relations . This leads to . Here is not equal to 0 but as (because the family of identification codes is defined for a fixed index set and the are chosen independently of ), this leads to . Finally can also be simplified into as .
One important difference with the CRE problem for transmission codes is that the solution is not trivial even for a noiseless channel. In fact, as the encoding is non deterministic and there are non-empty intersections between different encoding sets, that makes the reverse engineering of identification codes non trivial in many cases. We now look at the first-kind and second-kind error rates of the identification codes: if at least one error-rate is non zero, then
whereas the mutual information between a message and the received message would have been maximal with a transmission code. Intuitively, what makes the problem harder for identification codes is that the quantity of transmitted information can be very low.
Assume that the distribution is regular in the error rate inequalities of Definition 1 (the same probability holds for all ).
• Recall that the first-kind error rate indicates the probability to obtain a message not in the decoding set of , in which case would be almost equal to . Consequently, with probability we have . • Similarly, the second-kind error rate implies that with probability , would remain high as may also be in other decoding sets.
Corollary 1:
Let be of size . Assume that all encoding sets are of the same size in , i.e., there exists a parameter such that for every code , the encoding sets of defined by the probability distribution are all of same size: for all , . Assume also that we are in the context of a noiseless channel.
We have (2) with the number of received messages. Proof: Let be a random variable distributed as the 's and let be a random codeword encoding .
We know that . Moreover by hypothesis on the size of the encoding sets, and as the channel is noiseless, . Equation (1) becomes and we have , and . We see that the greater will be, the greater the righthand side of (2) will be. By using Fano's inequality as in [6] , we obtain that we need for guessing with negligible error probability when and go to infinity.
will go to infinity quickly as soon as is negligible compared to . In case of additional noise on the communication channel, the difficulty will increase with the level of noise (as for the classical CRE problem).
IV. APPLICATION TO BCCK PROTOCOL
Now comes the main contribution of our work: we use the CRE problem for identification codes to study the security of the BCCK identification protocol from an information theory perspective. [12] suggests to increase the security of the identification protocol [3] that originally relies on a computational assumption, the Polynomial Reconstruction problem, by additionally exploiting the CRE problem. The goal is to restrict further the information available to an eavesdropper or an active adversary, by keeping the used identification code as confidential. No security analysis was provided by [12] with respect to this suggestion so we prove below why this is a good one. The application of the information theory approach related to our study of the identification CRE problem furthermore enables us to obtain information theoretical security of [12] suggestion.
A. The Scheme in Details 1) Setting: We here describe how the whole identification scheme is designed.
We start by defining the class of identification codes that we use. Let be a finite field of size , , we define the set of the Moulin-Koetter identification codes from to . Let be the set of all polynomials over of degree at most . We sort the set following an arbitrary choice as and thus index it with integers . Following Definition 2, an identification code is defined according to some evaluation domain with: • encoding sets defined by for ; • for all , the encoding distribution is taken as the uniform distribution over ; • for all , the decoding set is defined as . This doing, a random code is determined by the random choice of elements in . The size of is . The protocol still follows [3] but with a random choice of a code in the family that becomes a secret shared among all parties (reader and devices). More precisely it is the evaluation domain that is confidential. One instance of the protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2 where the device corresponds to the one referenced under primary index and a secondary index (the first index is for the identification request and the second for the device's acknowledgment). In the sequel we will refer to this variant of the BCCK protocol as the enhanced BCCK identification protocol.
2) Adversary: We assume that the adversary knows the family of identification codes of the system but he does not know the specific code that is in use. When eavesdropping on the channel the queries made by a reader and the answers produced by the devices, the adversary will see a number of messages and . To be able to track a particular device, he needs to determine when the same polynomial has been used with two different values , . To do so, he must recover information on the evaluation domain, i.e., learn information on the code that is used.
To simplify the analysis, we assume in the sequel that, when trying to reverse engineer the identification code, the adversary eavesdrops the first message only when a reader communicates with a device. This is in fact easy to enforce by taking 2 different random codes, one for the reader query, the second one for the device answer.
B. Application of Section III Results
We now want to apply our previously established results on the difficulty of the identification CRE problem to derive security results on the protocol. 1) Direct Application: For the above family of Moulin-Koetter identification codes, we first remark that one of the main assumptions of Corollary 1 is fulfilled as all the encoding sets have the same number of elements , i.e., with . Hence, assuming that the channel is noiseless, Corollary 1 leads to the following result.
Lemma 3: Given independent eavesdropped messages in the enhanced BCCK identification protocol, the uncertainty on the knowledge of the adversary on the secret identification code that is used satisfies This underlines the difficulty of the CRE problem in this setting when and grow to infinity for polynomial in .
Remark 2: Taking back the set of parameters given in Section II-C, that leads to -identification codes, the latter lemma gives:
Unfortunately, as is approximately equal to , taking makes the lower bound useless. Consequently, we need a more stringent result than the one we just obtained. This motivates the introduction of a new tighter lower bound.
2) Specific Lower Bound: Via an analysis specific to the Moulin-Koetter construction, we derive the new following result.
Proposition 1: For the family of Moulin-Koetter identification codes defined as above over with , for independent choices of messages to be encoded for a random choice of , we have exactly where are the received messages, independently and randomly chosen in the encoding sets of , and eavesdropped by the adversary (without noise).
Proof: From (1), we have where and are two random variables distributed respectively as the 's and the 's. For all , we have , , and we know that the uncertainty on knowing and corresponds to the choice of a polynomial of degree at most , i.e., . Thus,
and
. Moreover as is the (non conditional) entropy of when uniformly drawn from , this is the maximal value for .
This proves that an adversary gains no information in this situation of independent eavesdropped messages as the entropy is maximal.
C. Validity of the Independence Assumption
In the protocol of [3] , the messages to be encoded and the encoding messages are not fully independent due: 1) to the relative small size of the encoding sets and the correlation between them (one can detect if the same index is used to encode independent polynomials); 2) to the potential ability of an adversary to detect whether two encoding messages are sent to the same CLD (i.e., that they are related to the same polynomial/message to be encoded), for instance if he succeeds to isolate one specific CLD. We now study the impact on the previous estimation in Proposition 1 when we do not assume that the messages are independent.
1) Generalization of Lemma 2: First, we give below a more general version of Lemma 2 for the situation where independent choices are not required. as the family of identification codes is defined for a fixed index set and the are chosen independently of , this proves the result.
As is always greater than , we obtain Moreover, , where is a random variable distributed as the 's. Thus (4) 2) Application to the Enhanced BCCK Identification Protocol: With the parameters of the identification protocol, we deduce where corresponds to the messages (not necessarily independent) eavesdropped by the adversary.
This implies that the knowledge of the adversary, on the code that is used, is still negligible, even in the context of non independent messages, when grows to infinity for polynomial in . For the parameters from Section II-C, , , , the lower bound is which remains high only for
. 3) Improved Lower Bound: We now study a tighter estimation directly from (3). To correspond to the situation where the adversary is able to determine whether the same CLD is aimed (for instance by capturing it), assume that in , each message is repeated times exactly. We assume that for, the same index , a different encoded message is used every time.
We obtain for , the same result as in Proposition 1, whereas the entropy decreases for .
Proposition 2: For the family of Moulin-Koetter identification codes defined as above over with , for messages to be encoded, each with repetitions, for a random choice of , we have the two following cases.
For for ,
where corresponds to that are the received messages, randomly chosen in the encoding sets of with exactly different choices per , and eavesdropped by the adversary (without noise).
Proof: We replace in (3) each component of the right-hand side of the equation with its exact value.
• We know that . • From the knowledge of and evaluations of the polynomial , we reduce the difficulty to retrieve to the exhaustive search among polynomials of degree , thus if , 0 otherwise. • The space of received messages , for and is and as there is no repetition on the first coordinate of the messages related to a same , we obtain . • For a similar reason, we get . This finishes the proof.
Following the intuition, with non independent messages, the proposition implies that the adversary gains some knowledge on the chosen code only when the order of repetition is strictly greater than .
We set the same parameters as in Section II-C, , ,
. The lower bound is For instance, this remains high until about with and for . The number of needed eavesdropped messages to have a low lower bound decreases down to approximately 2341 while increasing the number of repetitions up to .
On the one hand, this can be interpreted as follows. A passive eavesdropping of 2048 BCCK identifications of the same CLD may enable an adversary to get almost all information on the underlying code when . On the other hand, note that with only 2340 such eavesdroppings, the entropy stays very high for the adversary.
